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Introduction
This report on the performance of defaulted bonds and bank loans presents our annual update and analysis. For in-depth discussions of the supply and demand elements of defaulted and distressed securities, as well as their performance and other attributes, see Altman (1993 Altman ( -1999 , (1991), (1993) ; Branch and Ray (1992) ; Altman & Eberhart (1994) ; Ward & Griepentrog (1993) ; Gilson (1995) ; Hotchkiss and Mooradian (1998) ; Reilly, Wright and Altman (1998); and Eberhart, Altman and Aggarwal (1999) . Despite the lackluster performance of defaulted bonds and bank loans in the last several years, we are confident that this "asset class" will continue to attract an increasing amount of new capital and the supply of distressed and defaulted securities will continue to grow -a phenomena that manifested itself strongly over the past 12 months.
Monitoring Performance
In order to monitor the performance of defaulted debt securities, a measure called the Altman-NYU Salomon Center Defaulted Bond Index (A-NYU Index) was developed in 1990. 1 The sample period of our Index starts in January 1987 and, as of December 31, 1999, contained 83 issues (60 companies) with a market value of $4.1 billion and a face value of its component securities of $16.3 billion. This is a dramatic increase from the $1.4 and $5.5 billion amounts at the end of 1998. The number of issues in the Index is considerably larger than in the recent past and is more reminiscent of the size of the Index in 1993 and 1994. Indeed, the size of our Index, in terms of face value of public defaulted bonds, is close to that of the early 1990s. Figure 1 shows the size of the index at 4 year-end since its inception in December 1986. Note the variability in the number of issues from as low as 30 in 1986 to as high as 231 in 1992. In our report last year, we predicted that the size of the Index, as measured by market values and number of issues, would increase in the coming years as defaults begin to rise -and it did in a most spectacular way in 1999 (see our data at a later point in Figure 9 ).
One measure of the defaulted bond market's current relative health, and also its potential, is the ratio of the aggregate market value to face value of the component securities that comprise our indexes (last column of Exhibit 1). This ratio has ranged, at year-end, from a high of 0.74 in 1987 to its present low level of 0.25. In most years, this ratio varied between a fairly narrow range of about 0.40 to 0.52. Excellent returns in 1987 (+38.0%) resulted in the market/face ratio of 0.74, while the precipitous declines in 1989, 1990 and 1998 dropped the ratio to below 0.30. If you believe in the eventual "regression to the mean" phenomenon, as we do, then 1999's year-end low of 0.25 bodes well for future increases in the ratio and high investment returns. The 1999 extremely low ratio is especially interesting in that newly defaulted bonds' price levels generally average about 40% of face value for all bonds and 50% for senior unsecured corporates.
And, the majority of our 83 bond index issues are "senior" in priority.
In 1999, however, the average price of bonds just after default dropped to below 30 cents on the dollar, and, despite the reasonably positive performance of our Public Bond Index in 1999 (11.3%), the market/face value ratio remained at its all time low of 0.25.
The A-NYU Index includes securities of companies at various stages of the reorganization process, either in bankruptcy or in a restructuring. Data on returns is compiled from just after default up to when the bankrupt firm either emerges from 5 Chapter 11, is liquidated, or until the default is "cured" or resolved through an exchange.
Distressed restructuring company securities are also included. The Index includes issues of all seniorities, from senior-secured to junior-unsecured debt. A study by Altman & Eberhart (1994) , updated by us for Standard & Poor's (Brand & Behar, 1998) , assesses the performance of defaulted debt from the time of original issuance through default and then to emergence from bankruptcy. These studies concluded that the seniority of the issue is an extremely important determinant of the performance of defaulted debt for specific periods, not only from issuance to emergence but also from default to emergence. (Note that the A-NYU Index does not include convertible or international company issues).
An asset class related to defaulted debt securities is the equities of firms emerging from Chapter 11. Eberhart, Altman and Aggarwal (1999) have studied the performance of 131 of these emerging, "orphan" equities and concluded that the 200-day postemergence performance has been significantly better than the market performance of common stocks in general, as compared to a sample of equities specifically matched to the emerging stocks. Since some number of distressed securities investors are investing in, or at least continue to hold, these equities and since their expected performance is linked to the values of debt securities while in reorganization, we will from time to time comment on their performance. A related study by Hotchkiss and Mooradian (1998) found that the active participation by "vulture" investors, (i.e., institutions who specialize in distressed securities), is associated with superior post-Chapter 11 performance of the emerging firm.
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Performance
As noted above, the Altman-NYU Salomon Center Index of defaulted bonds performed fairly well in 1999, increasing by 11.34% and reversing the two prior years of negative returns (Figure 2 ). Returns were actually excellent through the first half of the year (21%), but this was due to a relatively small number of issues (mainly wireless communication Chapter 11's) in an index that was still quite small in its size. The market performed poorly in the second half of the year (except in November), falling by over 8%, as the size of the index increased dramatically. The monthly returns for this past year, as well as for all of the prior 12 years, is shown in Appendix A. The Index rose from 221.9 at the end of 1998 to 247.0 at the end of 1999 (December 1986=100).
During 1999, there were several exceptionally good and several very poor months, as the index appeared to be quite volatile. The months with positive returns above 5% were March, April, and November while the corresponding poor months were August, September, and October. This compares with four months of ±5% returns in 1998 and none in 1997 (see our later discussion on highly volatile months in Figure 5 ).
In contrast, the S&P 500 Stock Index only had three monthly observations with returns or losses exceeding 5% in 1999 and six in 1998 and 1997.
The overall performance of defaulted debt securities was again considerably lower than the total return of the S&P 500 Common Stock Index (+20.98% -assuming reinvestment of dividends) but considerably above the Salomon Smith Barney High
Yield Bond Market Index (1.73%). On the other hand, "relatively safe" ten-year U.S.
Government securities performed poorly, losing 8.41% in 1999, as Treasury yields increased by almost 200 bps in the last 12 months.
Thirteen Year Comparative Performance
In Figure 2 , we observe the return on defaulted bonds as well as common stocks and high yield bonds for the entire thirteen-year sample period, 1987-1999 We also calculate the Sharpe ratio for each of our Risky Asset indexes. This ratio compares the excess performance (if any) of an asset class compared to default risk free Treasury Bonds (in this case we use ten-year Treasuries) and then divides this excess return by a measure of the volatility of the asset class -the standard deviation. Again, the defaulted bond index performance compares unfavorably to the other two asset classes when we observe this measure of return/risk performance. The poorer relative Sharpe ratio measure is still evident when calculating monthly returns, but the differences are not as great. Figure 3 graphs the monthly index levels for our three security classes for the entire sample period. We can observe that in March 1995, the S&P index level once again rose above the two others and remains solidly in that position. And, in mid-1997, the High Yield Bond Index nudged the Defaulted Bond Index out of second place.
Diversification Attributes: Risky Asset Returns Correlations
One of the potential strategies suggested by our analysis is to include defaulted debt in a larger portfolio of risky securities. A number of domestic pension funds and foreign portfolios have, in effect, taken this approach by allocating a proportion of their total investments to defaulted debt money managers. Almost all portfolio managers involved in the distressed market have been specialists in the sector, rather than investors in distressed bonds within broader-based portfolios. Therefore, the avenue of diversification appears to be primarily through the use of different investment managers.
(There are some rare exceptions where a mutual fund combines investments in more traditional debt and equity securities with distressed securities). A number of "fund-offunds" that have adopted this strategy have also chosen distressed securities managers with different styles including active, semi-active and passive approaches. A similar strategy, practiced by foreign closed-end funds, is to directly invest in a large number of private U.S. distressed securities investment funds. Instead of diversifying across asset classes, these funds have a strategy of investing in distressed security managers with different approaches.
Figure 4 demonstrates the correlation between the Altman-NYU Defaulted Bond
Index and the other two risky asset classes --common stocks and high yield bonds --for the last 13 years. We see that the monthly return correlation is only 0.26 between defaulted debt and S&P equities. This is down, somewhat, from 0.28 in the 1987-1998
period. Since defaulted debt holders usually end up owning the equity of the emerged Chapter 11 entity, unless they sell the debt just prior to emergence from restructuring, it is interesting to note the low correlation of returns between these two indexes.
Furthermore, the quarterly correlations are even lower (0.23).
The correlation between high yield bonds and defaulted bonds is fairly high at about 0.56 (monthly) and 0.57 (quarterly). Interestingly, the correlations between high yield bonds and our Defaulted Loan Index ( Figure 5 ) is significantly lower at 0.44 (monthly) while the correlation of loans and equities is actually negative, indicating an inverse relationship. The quarterly correlation of loans and equities is essentially zero.
We believe that the relatively high correlation of defaulted securities and risky bonds is partially a function of the operating performance of firms in general, the outlook for risky companies, and the overall confidence in the market for risky debt. Although these latter correlations are relatively high, it is also clear that the Defaulted Debt Index is more volatile --in both good and bad years. Again, this is not surprising since high yield debt has a base return equal to the interest payments received in each period while virtually all defaulted bonds and most defaulted loans trade "flat" (without interest receipts). In addition, there is a great deal of uncertainty about what the reorganization plan will specify and how each class of creditors will be treated --not to mention the possibility that the end-result will be a liquidation. Finally, there are several critical event dates during a bankruptcy reorganization (i.e., bankruptcy filing, post-default financing, filing of a reorganization plan and the actual plan confirmation/ liquidation) which can result in large swings in the price of debt issues.
We do observe that the relative volatility between defaulted debt and equity returns, when measured on a monthly basis, puts the former in a much more favorable light. This implies a greater degree of autocorrelation (strings of gains or losses) that can exacerbate annual return levels and volatility but not monthly return variability.
Correlations in Exceptional Months
The correlations listed in Figure The correlations calculated (not shown) from the data for the exceptional months are all considerably higher than the correlations when they are measured over the entire 13-year period. For example, our defaulted bond index had a 0.46 correlation with the stock market compared to 0.26 for the entire period. And the S&P 500 Stock Index correlation with high yield bonds jumps from 0.53 to 0.61. This implies a type of contagion effect in these highly volatile months. The more liquid, and larger stock markets' extreme performance in these months impacts the performance of "fixed" income securities that are also perceived as risky and quite a bit less liquid. Despite the higher correlations during exceptional months, we also observe that in 14 of 32 months, the stock market and defaulted bond market moved in opposite directions. In the case of negative exceptional stock market months, however (6 instances), in two instances the defaulted bond market increased (November 1987 and August 1997) and in one instance (November 1987) the high yield bond index increased.
Defaulted Bank Loan Performance
In terms of rigorous analysis, a long neglected segment of the distressed securities market is the private debt of defaulting companies --particularly bank debt. This neglect is in contrast to the market's increasing size and interest amongst investors and market makers who trade bank debt of distressed firms. We have attempted to fill this void by calculating an index of defaulted bank debt facilities. Miller & Keisman, 1999) .
The performance of our Bank Loan Index was relatively poor in 1999, marginally gaining 0.65%. The index closed as of the end of 1999 at 109.9 (December 1995=100).
Bank loans did not enjoy the early-in-the-year increases that defaulted bonds did. Indeed, in only seven of the 12 months in 1999, did our Defaulted Bond and Bank Loan Indexes have the same sign (+ or -) in terms of monthly returns. The monthly Defaulted Bank Loan Index, from its inception to the present, is shown in Appendix B. Figure 8 shows that the four-year (1996-1999) Defaulted Bank Loan average return was 2.93% per year, considerably below the stock market's continued incredible performance and also below that of high yield bonds. Like defaulted bonds, the annual standard deviation for defaulted securities was the highest, and the monthly standard error was lower than the stock market's and above that of high yield bonds.
Combined Bond and Bank Loan Index
We have also created a Combined Defaulted Securities Index, which is calculated based on the market values and total returns of public bonds and private bank loans (see Appendix C). The Combined Index return was 4.45% in 1999, causing the cumulative four-year index to again exceed 100.0 -but just barely. With the three indexes, we now offer benchmark performance criteria for a more broadly defined distressed securities market.
New Supply of Distressed and Defaulted Securities
We can observe that there has been a considerable increase in the size of the public and private distressed debt market in the past year. From Figure 1 , we see that the market value of our bond index in 1999 is now only slightly below what it was in 1990-1993 (except 1992) . The number of issues, while considerably above the level of just one year ago (83 vs. 36), is still below the levels of the early 1990's. The large increase in our Public Bond Index's size came from the record amount of new defaults in 1999 of over $23 billion on a default rate of 4.15% of the high yield bond market (see Figure 9 ).
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As for the future, we expect the market for distressed and defaulted securities to continue to increase considerably. The huge new issue supply of non-investment grade debt in the last seven years of over $560 billion should result in an increase of default amounts in the coming years. Although we do not expect the near-term default rates to approach the record years of 1990 and 1991, the net supply of distressed and defaulted issues will almost certainly increase. Indeed, based on our mortality rate estimation technique (Altman, 1989) and considering the last 10 years of new issuance in the corporate bond markets, we expect new public bond defaults of $60 billion and $24 billion (face values and market values) over the next three years (Figures 10 and 11) . We also expect private defaulted debt (mainly bank loans) to add $144 billion (face value) and $100 billion (market value) to the defaulted debt aggregate totals.
The current level of 45 bank facilities from 23 companies in our Index is already larger than at any time in the past. We also anticipate that the market to face value ratio will rise from its current historically low level of 0.53. (1987 -1999) (1987 -1999) (1987 -1999) (1987 -1999) (1987 -1999) 
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